Friday 31 October 2014

Hannibal Episode 71 Preview

Hello and welcome to A History Of – Hannibal and the Punic Wars. Episode 71 – Scipio in Spain. “A word on the site of the site of New Carthage: about half-way down the east coast of Spain there is a bay, open to the south-west; it runs about two and a half miles inland and in breadth is some three hundred yards less. At the mouth of the inlet a small island protects the anchorage from all winds except the south-west. From the head of the bag a peninsula runs out, high land, on which the town was built. Thus the town has sea to the east and south of it, while on its western and part of its northern sides it is surrounded by a lagoon in which the depth of water varies with the ebb and flow of the tide. It is connected with the mainland by a ridge about 250 yards wide. Fortification on this side would have involved little labour, but Scipio none the less had no earthwork constructed, perhaps out of ostentation, to show the enemy his confidence, perhaps to leave the way back unobstructed every time he had need to approach the walls.” Livy, Book 26, Chapter 42. I thought this quote would be the best way to kick start episode 71 as we left Scipio at the walls of New Carthage. That, and I would also like to begin with a correction of sorts as I didn’t check my footnotes when writing the end of last week. I said that Scipio and Laelius travelled from the Ebro to New Carthage in 7 days, but as the footnotes of my translation make clear Polybius writes that these two locations are 325 miles apart, which of course makes the 7 day travel time found in Livy a bit incredulous to say the least. As much as historians don’t like to admit it, an awful lot of the time the sources give information which disagree completely, meaning that either one or both sources is talking nonsense. For instance, Caesar writes in his commentaries on the Gallic War that he conquered 400 tribes. Then Cassius Dio writes that tribes varied size, with the largest having 200,000 fighting men and the smallest having 50,000. If we take an average then, the average tribe would have 125,000 fighting men. Now, to take into account women, children and those in old age we can multiply this figure by 4, giving an average tribe size of 500,000. Now, there were 400 tribes in Gaul, which, so it logically follows, means that when Caesar conquered Gaul there was a population of 200,000,000 people. 200 million people. 3 times the population of modern France. Just a nice, happy reminder that we really don’t know that much about anything.  Now, back to New Carthage.

Scipio prepared for the attack by stationing the fleet in the harbour, and the army right by the city so the townspeople would know that they were surrounded on all sides. We have lost the beginnings of the attack, so the first thing we know to have happened was that Mago, the commander in the town, but not one of the three Carthaginian generals in the peninsula, so began to organise a defence, sending out some troops to combat the Romans. The Romans drew back so that they would be nearer their reserves and could rapidly rotate troops, something which gave then a huge advantage and they successfully pushed the Carthaginians back. Scipio could see that now the walls were undefended, and so he launched an attack with ladders from both land and sea. The Romans launched the assault, but there was enough time for the Carthaginians to re-man the walls and to gather missiles, but the most useful factor in the defence of the city proved to be the walls. They were very high, and most of the Roman ladders were unable to reach the top, and those that could were extremely unstable. The first attack did not go particularly well, but as soon as it was over Scipio prepared for a second assault.

Sunday 26 October 2014

The Arab Spring - A History. Episode 31 - Khomeini Supreme

This week we examine the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini is now in power, and he is determined to change the world. This involves ending his alliance with the communists, going to war with Iran, and, of course, the infamous capture of the American embassy in Tehran.

Saturday 25 October 2014

Arab Spring 31 Preview

Welcome to The Arab Spring – A History. Episode 31 – Khomeini Supreme. I want to begin today with a moment of reflection. 1979 is a year which will live in infamy. It will go down in history as a momentous moment when everything changed, just as when Caesar was killed in 44BC or the French Revolution of 1789. This is why I have felt the need to give such a slow, for this podcast anyway, account of the revolution last time out. For a time in the late 20th century, there existed an idea that history was ending. No, I’m not talking about the apocalypse, although there was plenty of talk of that as well. What I mean is that history is very complicated with millions of factors pushing nations in different directions. It’s why predicting the future is so horrendously difficult. Things seemingly appear out of nowhere, but once they’ve happened you can look back and see their origins and trace them, and explain the world around you. This is exactly what we’re doing. The Arab Spring seemingly just happened, but if you examine what was going on, you can see what was happening and where things were going. Somehow, people had managed to forget this. There was so much focus on the Cold War, East vs. West, communism versus capitalism, that alternatives were almost forgotten. When the West began to get the upper hand in the Cold War, there was a sense that the whole world was on the road to western style democracy. It was a system which worked universally. It may take more time in other places, but it was assumed that eventually every nation would adopt this model and follow in the West’s footsteps. The whole world would use the same system, and history would be something we could all forget about. This is a world view which has taken arguably until into the 21st century view to be recognised as absurd, but it was something shown by 1979. In the secular democratic world being envisioned, there was no room for the radical Islamic Theocracy which had appeared in Iran. It showed the world that things could not be so easily predicted, that, at least for the moment, there was no universal theory of government, and, something which is very important to your humble podcaster, it proved that history was not over just yet. I hope you found that interesting, and I haven’t just put you off listening to the show anymore. So, let’s get back into things.

Khomeini arrived in Iran to a tremendous reception, and soon enough the army surrendered. The Prime Minister fled the country and many of the Shah’s associates were executed. Khomeini was determined that this moment would be a game changer in the Middle East. If his revolution was to have as much of an impact as the French revolution had, then it would be necessary for it to not be confined to one country, but to spread across the region. Khomeini denounced every Muslim country, calling all the governments unIslamic and called for them to be overthrown. He said that a true Muslim state should not side with either the East or West, but he held a special hatred for America. Greatly worried by this, the staff at the American embassy was reduced from 2000 to under a hundred. Carter did not want to risk the lives of those in still in the embassy, and so refused the Shah entry into the US.

Sunday 19 October 2014

A History Of - Hannibal. Episode 70 - Spain Again

This week we travel back to Spain to look at an incident between Nero and Hasdrubal, a prelude to the Metaurus. We then introduce Scipio Africanus into the narrative and take him to Spain, where he plans an attack on New Carthage.

Friday 17 October 2014

Hannibal Episode 70 Preview

I've decided I like the idea of putting bits of episode text on the Friday before releasing an episode. I'm going to carry on with it for the moment, maybe it will become a regular website feature. So, without further ado, here is the openning to Hannibal Episode 70 - Spain Again.

Aside from a brief campaign in Liguria, the Italian theatre is now effectively over. After a serious of disasters  for Hannibal the Metaurus was the straw which broke the Carthaginian army’s back. In late 207 Hannibal fled into Bruttium where he would hide, doing nothing throughout 206 and meaning that when Scipio Africanus was elected consul in 205 the war was ready to move to Africa. But, this really is only half the story. Spain is where the real action in these years was happening, it is where Scipio gained his reputation before he was ready to face Hannibal. This is why I wanted to focus on the Italian theatre first. If anything, this podcast is covering overlooked aspects of a famous war which is often horrendously oversimplified. In this simplified narrative Hannibal wins his big battles, gets chased around Italy for a few years while Scipio goes to Spain, then there is the big finally in Africa. If you, dear listener, remember anything about this podcast in 10 years’ time, I hope it is that those years when Hannibal and the Romans are fighting in Italy are tremendously interesting. The slow grind the Romans fought against the Carthaginians, slowly pushing Hannibal further and further south, was what won them the war as much as any of the big battles. But, now we have covered this, it is time to get into the more famous stuff. So, just where were we when we left things in Spain back in episode 53.

Well, the two Roman commanders, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, had just been killed. It looked very likely that the Carthaginians would sweep north, across the river Ebro and into Italy, being led by their trifecta of commanders, Hasdrubal Gisgo, Hasdrubal Barca and Mago Barca. To keep things simple these shall be known as Gisgo, Hasdrubal and Mago respectively. This would have happened were it not for Lucius Marcius. Marcius managed to regroup the shattered Roman forces and turn them back into an army. It was a small army, and a weak army, but it was an army, and was something that the Carthaginians were not expecting to face. Mancius was able to fend off the Carthaginian force and even launch a counter attack on the Carthaginian camp, capturing it while the Carthaginian command was divided. And so in 210 we rejoin the story.

Things were quite following these events for a while as neither side was prepared to make a move. Following the capture of Capua the Romans sent Nero, he would be victorious in the Metaurus along with Livius, to Spain to take over the command. He landed at Tarraco, the modern Tarragona not too far from Barcelona. Quite quickly Nero appeared to have an early success against the man who would defeat at that famous battle, Hasdrubal. Nero found Hasdrubal in a valley, and was able to trap him. To have one of the three Carthaginian commanders trapped was a great position to be in, and so Nero was delighted when Hasdrubal sent messengers to him asking for a peace settlement. If Nero let him out of the valley alive then he promised that he would abandon Spain. As with many things, the deal was too good to be true. 

Sunday 12 October 2014

The Arab Spring - A History. Episode 30 - The Islamic Revolution

This week we watch the Shah's regime try to become a regional power before entering its death spiral. Finally the people snap and a year long revolution follows, forcing the Shah out of the country and heralding the return of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Saturday 11 October 2014

The Arab Spring - A History, Episode 30 Preview - The Islamic Revolution

Hello. This is a post for people who may be new to the series, or just can't wait for Sunday's episode. In a website exclusive I'm going to have in this post the script to The Arab Spring - A History, Episode 30 - The Islamic Revolution. If you like what you read, make sure to download the episode and subscribe to the series!

Welcome to the Arab Spring – A History. Episode 30 – The Islamic Revolution. Following the White Revolution, Mohammed Reza felt confident enough to have some controlled political debate. There would be two parties who could compete for royal favour, but he was still the master of the situation. In March 1964 the young and promising Hasan Ali Mansur came to the office of Prime Minister, but he was assassinated in January of the next year and replaced by Amir Abbas Huvaida, he would manage to hold on to the office until 1977. Despite the new political party, there was no political debate in these years, and opposition was forced underground into Islamic Socialist groups, who did use terror tactics. These activities were not seen by the outside world, instead they focused on Iran as the protégé of the United States, while also having a good relationship with the Soviets and China, this being partly due to US president Richard Nixon’s relationship with China. As for the Soviets, they were more than happy to try and pry Iran away from the United States. They had a desire for Iranian resources, particularly natural gas. So a deal was made in 1966 and 1967 which saw Iran provide the USSR with over $600M of natural gas in exchange for the Soviets building a steel complex in Isfahan and providing about $110M of light arms. As the 1960s came to a close Iran’s position in the region was growing, but there was one rather large problem with all this.

It seems that the Shah actually began to believe his own propaganda with how things turned as they entered the 1970s. While most in the country languished in poverty, the Shah wasted money with the infamous Persepolis Party of 1971 which celebrated 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy. Meanwhile the shah became obsessed with making Iran the dominant military power in the region, and heavily invested in its military, rather than in helping the countries people. This really got underway in 1971 when the British pulled out of the Persian Gulf.

This was a particularly unstable time period in the region. Iran had close relations on its eastern flank with Pakistan, a state which was greatly weakened by the secession of its eastern half which became Bangladesh in 1971. This happened as Russia strengthened its relationship with India, Pakistan’s great rival, and an independence movement began in the North-Western provinces of Pakistan with the backing of Afghanistan. Meanwhile Marxist revolutionaries were moving against the pro-Western governments of the gulf, one centre of activity being southern Oman, the country on the south-eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. This greatly worried the west, who wanted a strong pro-Western force in the region, so Iran stepped in with the backing of the United States.

 Nixon and Kissinger met the shah in Tehran in 1972 and it was agreed that with the exception of nuclear weapons he would be allowed to buy American arms. This was part of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine was a theory which followed the disaster of Vietnam. To quote the weekly compilation of Presidential documents from 23rd February 1970 it would “construct a world system in which the United States, the central power, would help generate strong regional actors, who would secure their own and American interest in their respective regions.”

The shah just needed to money to do this, which if you’ll recall our previous episodes on Saudi Arabia and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is right when the Arab oil boycott occurred, which was great news for oil producing countries not involved in the boycott, such as Iran. Iran’s position with the West strengthened as a reliable producer of oil, while it also brought the Arab oil producers back into the fold. The Shah had big plans for this oil, including a huge economic push for industrialisation and a development of Iran’s military. His plan was that Iran would be a regional superpower by 1981 and by the end of the 1980s be a global military power.

However, things were not as rosy for the shah as first appeared. If you think back to when we looked at the election of US President Jimmy Carter, in the 1970s there was a fierce reaction to two events, Vietnam and Watergate. Both had made the average American distrustful of Washington, which we have discussed, but there were effects on the press too. Vietnam greatly wearied the US to foreign adventure, and people began to look at Iran, and for the first time asked just what America was doing. Were they really propping up a tyrannical dictator? Was that really what they, the freedom loving United States of America, were doing? Following Watergate the press began to dig a little deeper, and the answer was, yes. That was exactly what they were doing. Reports of the brutality of SAVAK came out and began to gain traction for the first time. Amnesty International’s 1975 report on the treatment of political prisoners gained much attention. P. Jacobson’s article “Torture in Iran” in the Sunday Times in January 1975 included the line “no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran”. The shah was losing his international credibility as the stark contrast between the extravagance of the Persepolis Party and the grim realities of living in the shanty towns of Tehran, such as malnutrition and illiteracy. Particularly following Carter’s election it was unclear about whether the shah would have his backing should there be trouble, despite that in November 1977 Carter pledged his support to the Shah, calling him “a stabilising force in the world at large”.

It was soon clear that there were problems with the Shah’s plans. The military and industrialisation push was launched in 1974, and by 1977 they were already failing to meet targets. He had failed to create an economic base before the military push, which was heavily damaging Iranian development. Just how powerless the shah really was shown in the Afghan coup of April 1978 which saw the communists come to power, and the shah was able to do nothing. Domestically Iran was suffering from the rise in the cost of consumer goods from the west, an effect of the rising cost of oil. While the shah was focused on his military reforms which were going nowhere, he was ignoring food shortages, rising unemployment and essential services fell apart. The people resented the shah, and resented the Americans who always seemed to get the best jobs. The west sold goods to Iran which couldn’t properly be moved around as there wasn’t the infrastructure. At the same time as Carter called Mohammed Reza “a stabilising force in the world at large” he was ignoring the fact that his country was starving. Land reform had failed, only causing disruption without increasing productivity. The attempted political reform had been dropped and Iran once again became a one party state, a one party state which had the philosophy of ‘if you’re not with us, you’re against us’. He was unable to relate to the people, and had no idea just how unpopular he was. He had no idea about the religious sermons criticising the shah, and of the tapes Khomeini was smuggling into the country. There were lots and lots of reason as to why revolution was bubbling which we’ve covered, but it was the accelerated development which the country couldn’t cope with which was the final straw. It would take some time to come to fruition, but the revolution got underway on 7 January 1978.

On this date a daily newspaper in Tehran ran with an article which attacked Ayatollah Khomeini, an article which of course came directly from the administration. This article drew the ire of the crowds, and the newspapers offices were attacked. On the 9th a crowd gathered at a shrine in Qum, with demands for a move towards a more liberal constitution. Once the crowd began to leave they found that the police were waiting for them, and the crowd was fired upon. Ayatollah Shari’atmadari spoke out against this, calling the government’s actions unIslamic. He called for protests, but that the forty days of mourning be respected. This effectively created throughout the year a pattern of riots every 40 days, once the mourning for the dead of the previous riot had been completed. For instance in Tabriz there were attacks on representations of Westernisation on 18th and 19th of February, which led to deaths and a forty day mourning period.

As the year progressed the Shah’s government was surprised by the size of the protests, which were much larger than previous ones due to the flood of migrants form the countryside who were seeking work. These crowds were alone in the city. Tehran was much different to the countryside, but there was one thing which remained the same – the local mosque. It was a movement which the west could not comprehend. To quote Bruce Riedel of the CIA, “Our bosses couldn’t cope with the idea of an 80 year old Ayatollah, which they didn’t even know what an Ayatollah was, who lived on garlic and onions and yoghurt, directing a revolution that was about to topple America’s most important ally.”

The crowds simply grew larger and larger in these cycles of protests, despite the banning of public gatherings. In one protest in Tehran over a hundred demonstrators were killed by the Shah’s forces. These crowds were not leaderless, they were just awaiting instructions from Khomeini who had been directing the revolution from Iraq. He told them to stay on the streets, and keep up the pressure. Saddam Hussein was very uncomfortable with this, and sent word to the Iranians in late 1978 that he would either exile or eliminate Khomeini, it was there choice, but either way he would not stay in Iraq. The Shah was fearful of created a martyr, so Khomeini was forced out of Iraq, going to Kuwait, but was refused entry.

Trying to work out just where to go, his advisors recommended Paris. They would not need visas to travel there and Paris was the centre of European politics. Khomeini agreed and set up a base about 18 miles from Paris in October 1978, but never actually visited the city. From there he could reach his supporters who gathered to him from all over the world, as well as having easy access to western media allowing him to defend the actions of his supporters in Iran. It was very embarrassing for the French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who felt the need to publically say, and I quote, “Ayatollah Khomeini has not come to France as a political refugee. He is a foreign resident in France.” Khomeini was warned by the French government that his actions were not appropriate on French soil, and he responded by saying he was merely sending letters to Iran, and that whatever people chose to do with those letters was of no concern to France.

Strikes began, organised by the left, which grew once they received Khomeini’s support and ground the country to a halt. The Shah’s advisors urged military action, but he refused to go against the constitution. By 4th November BBC News reported that there was almost daily fighting on the streets of Tehran. Though, when questioned by American diplomats, the Shah’s generals would refuse to admit that the regime was crumbling. The American ambassador wrote to Washington with a clear message, Iran was in peril. Carter was unnerved, as were his advisors. What they wanted more than anything was stability, and that was what the Shah had brought to the table for the last 20 years. They did not want to introduce yet another unstable element into the region. But they were divided as to how to fix the problem. Reforms, or to use an iron fist? That was the question. What resulted has to be one of the most unhelpful pieces of advice in history, as the shah was encouraged to clamp down on the protestors while at the same time to make a deal with them. Confused, the Shah summoned Ambassador Sullivan and asked whether America wanted him to take a hard line, and Sullivan replied that he had no instructions on that.

The Shah decided to go on television and embrace the revolutionaries, saying that he was an Iranian and respected his people’s revolution. He would build a better Iran. But, he said he would take an extended holiday from Iran with his family. The Americans were not keen on this, and so sort assurances that the army would enforce the Shah’s rule in his absence. The generals replied that they would. When asked how they would do this, they could not give a response. As you will have noticed through the shah’s relationship with his various prime ministers he was a paranoid man, and so would not allow the army to make such plans out of a fear they would overthrow him. The Shah was furious with the Americans for going behind his back in this. Before he left, Shapour Bakhitar was appointed Prime Minister. He was a moderate and a former opponent of the regime, and it was hoped that this would be enough to calm the situation down, but it was far too little, far too late. The Shah left the country on the 16th January 1979. He would never return, and would soon die in exile as he fought a losing battle with cancer.

It was clear to the west that the Shah was of no use to them, and so they set their hopes with Bakhitar, and asked Khomeini to remain in France rather than returning to Iran so that Bakhitar could have a chance to get the situation under control. Should Bakhitar fall, Khomeini could end up facing the army. Khomeini took this as a threat, and told Carter that he needed to stop supporting forces which opposed the people’s will. He told his supporters to give flowers to the soldiers, which they did, along with chants such as, “Brothers, we give you flowers, you give us bullets!” Many of the soldiers had been conscripts and actually supported Khomeini, so with this many deserted and joined the revolutionaries. There was though a small group which was determined to prevent him returning to the country. His advisors debated over when the right time to depart was, though one day Khomeini just told them it was time. They may not want to follow him as it might be dangerous, the plane might be shot down, but it was time for him to return to Iran.

On 1st February 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini finally arrived in Iran, to mass popular support, whereupon he pronounced the creation of the Islamic Republic, bringing to an end two and a half thousand years of Iranian monarchy. This was the Islamic Revolution.